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STATEMENT SHOWING JURISDICTION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS
Section
amended, grants

78-2a-3(j),
appellate

Utah

Code

jurisdiction

Annotated,

to

as

the Court of

Appeals over cases transferred from the Utah Supreme Court
pursuant

to Section

78-2-2(4), Utah Code Annotated, as

amended.
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
AND THE STANDARD OF APPELLATE REVIEW
The

issue presented

for

review

is whether

the

District Court was correct in granting summary judgment to
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Appellee Burgess by holding that any modification of a written sales contract between a real estate broker and its
seller client had to be in writing and signed by the seller
to satisfy the requirement of the Statute of Frauds, Section
25-5-4(5), Utah Code Annotated, as amended.
Because this is an appeal from a granting of summary judgment and presents only questions of law, the standard of review is for correctness, Gaw v. State of Utah, 143
U.A.R. 27 (Utah App. 09/13/90); Transamerica Cash Res., Inc.
v. Dixie Power & Water, Inc., 789 P.2d 24 (Utah 1990).

The

facts and inferences must be analyzed in the light most
favorable to the losing party.

Provo City Corp. v. State,

137 U.A.R. 8 (Utah 1990).
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES,
ORDINANCES AND RULES
Section 25-5-4(5), Utah Code Annotated, as amended.
Certain agreements void unless written and signed.
The following agreements are void unless the
agreement, or some not or memorandum of the agreement, is in
writing, signed by the party to be charged with the
agreement:

(5) Every agreement authorizing or employing an
agent or broker to purchase or sell real estate for
compensation.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Appellee (hereinafter "Mr. Burgess") is the owner
of certain real property located at 3175 East Wind River
Drive

in

Layton,

Utah

(hereinafter

-2

"the

property").

Complaint, paragraph #3, R at 2. On or about July 26, 1988,
Mr.

Burgess

Homestead

executed

Realtors

(hereinafter

and

and

its

delivered

to

Appellants

Realtor,

Warren

Burbank,

"the brokers"), a Sales Agency Contract by

which terms Mr. Burgess retained Homestead Realtors for the
purpose of listing and selling the property, R, at 85,
(hereinafter "the Contract").

The Contract was for six (6)

months, with an expiration date of January 25, 1989, and
provided for a six (6) percent broker's commission, R at 83.
On January 26, 1989, Burbank telephoned Mr. Burgess
and obtained an oral agreement to extend the Contract for an
additional three months, until April 26, 1989 (Affidavit of
Warren Burbank, R at 76-77).

Mr. Burgess did not sign any

written extension of the Contract, Plaintiff1s Reply to
Defendant's First Request for Admissions, number 2, (R, at
)•

Subsequent to January 26, 1989, the Property was
shown

to William

and

Sandra Roberts, who

submitted

an

Earnest Money Receipt and Offer to Purchase on March 1, 1989
(Affidavit of Warren Burbank, R at 89-90).

Mr. Burgess

signed the Earnest Money Receipt on March 3, 1989 (Affidavit
of Warren Burbank, R, at 89-90).

Mr. Burgess was notified

by United Savings Bank that the Robertses had tendered the
money which was due from them in order to complete their
obligations under the Earnest Money Receipt, R, at 82. Mr.
Burgess refused to sign and complete the closing, R at 82.
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The record does not contain any evidence that Mr. Burgess
ever sold the property, and, in fact, the property was not
sold.
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
Under existing Utah case law, a listing agreement
authorizing or employing a broker to sell real estate for
compensation must be in writing, signed by the party to be
charged, and so must any modification of such a listing
agreement.

Mr. Burgess

did

not

sign

any modification

document, and, therefore, Judge Page correctly granted him
summary judgment.

The two cases relied upon by the Brokers,

one from Illinois and one from Oregon, are inapposite.

The

Illinois case, Bennett & Kahnweiler Associates v. Ratner,
133 111. App.3d 316, 478 N.E.2d 1138 (1985), concerned an
oral argument to modify a written extension clause in the
agency contract, while in the present case, there was no
written

extension

clause.

The

Oregon

case,

Wieneke

Properties, Inc. v. Thiessen, 94 Or. App. 306, 765 P.2d 815
(1988) was based upon prior Oregon case law which had held
that a written extension of time is not required to satisfy
the analogous Oregon statute of frauds, whereas Utah case
law has required a modification to be in writing.
Really, what

the Brokers

are trying

to do is

recover in quantum meruit, which, in fact, was part of the
basis for the Bennett & Kahnweiler decision.

-4-

Not only does

Utah not permit a broker to recover in quantum meruit,
Machan Hampshire

Properties

v. Western Real Estate and

Development Company, 779 P.2d 230 (Utah App. 1989), Young v.
Buchanan, 259 P.2d 876 (Utah 1953), but, even if such recovery were permitted, the Brokers in this case were not entitled to it because Mr. Burgess never sold the property and,
hence, has not been enriched.
ARGUMENT
POINT I. UNDER UTAH LAW,
A LISTING AGREEMENT
AUTHORIZING OR EMPLOYING AN AGENT OR
BROKER
TO
SELL
REAL
ESTATE
FOR
COMPENSATION MUST BE IN WRITING, SIGNED
BY THE PARTY SOUGHT TO BE CHARGED, AND SO
MUST ANY MODIFICATION THEREOF.
Utahfs Statute of Frauds states in pertinent part:
The following agreements are
void unless the agreement, or some note
or memorandum of the agreement, is in
writing, signed by the party to be
charged with the agreement:

(5) Every agreement authorizing or employing an agent or broker to
purchase
or
sell
real
estate for
compensation.
Section 25-5-4(5), Utah Code Annotated, as amended.

In the

present case, there is no valid agreement in writing that
was in effect on March 3, 1989.

In the district court the

brokers alleged two bases for a written agreement satisfying
the statute:

(1)

The Sales Agency Contract, R at 85, and

(2) The Earnest Money Receipt, R at 89-90.
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However, on

appeal, the brokers apparently have not argued that the
Earnest Money Receipt is a written memorandum sufficient to
satisfy the statute of frauds, so counsel will address only
the Sales Agency Contract.
Under
allege

and

Section

prove

an

25-5-4(5),
"express

supra,

contract

a
or

broker

must

agreement

of

authority in which the terms and conditions of employment,
if any, and the amount of his commission, etc., are stated,"
Case v. Ralph, 56 Utah 243, 188 P. 640 (1920) (emphasis
added), and that such contract is in writing.

C.J. Realty,

Inc. v. Willey, 758 P.2d 923 (Utah App. 1988).

This partic-

ular statute of frauds is part of the entire regulatory
scheme applicable to real estate brokerage transactions.
C.J. Realty, supra.
The contract, by its own terms, had expired prior
to the date on which the brokers showed the property to Mr.
and Mrs. Roberts, R at 89-90, but for purposes of this
Court's review, Mr. Burgess must be held to have extended,
verbally, the time of the Contract for 90 days beyond the
expiration date, R at 76-77.

It has long been the law in

Utah that where an original agreement is required to be in
writing to satisfy the statute of frauds, any subsequent
modification of that agreement must also be in writing in
order to be valid.

The Utah Supreme Court recognized this

rule in Golden Key Realty, Inc. v. Mantas, 699 P.2d 730
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(Utah 1985).

[See also, SCM Land Co. v.

Watkins & Faber,

732 P.2d 105 (Utah 1986); Zions Properties, Inc. v. Holt,
538 P.2d 1319 (Utah 1975).

In Golden Key Realty, supra, the

supreme court held:
...The rule is well settled in
Utah that if an original agreement is
within the statute of frauds, a subsequent agreement which modifies the original written agreement must also satisfy
the requirements of the statute of frauds
to be enforceable. 699 P.2d 730, at 732.
Thus, the extension of the durational time period of the
original Sales Agency Contract must not only have been
signed by Mr. Burgess, but must have set forth expressly all
of the conditions mentioned in Case v. Ralph, supra, and
C.J. Realty, supra.
Golden

Key

Realty

The verbal extension is void under
because

the modification

was not in

writing.
The brokers cite to two cases, from Illinois and
Oregon, in support of their contention that this is a case
of first impression in Utah and that this Court should follow the reasoning of the courts of these other states.
Appellee disagrees with both of these assertions.

First,

this is not a case of first impression, as mentioned above.
Appellee's

position

modification

is that an extension of time is a

of the agreement, and must be in writing,

Golden Key Realty, supra, and see discussion, below, of
Franke v. Blair Realty Co. , 119 Ohio St. 338, 164 N.E. 353

-7-

(1928).

Secondly, both

cases

cited

by Appellants

are

distinguishable.
At least one court of another jurisdiction has
ruled that time of performance of a listing-type agreement
is

an

essential

modification.

the

varying

of

which

is

a

In Franke v. Blair Realty Co., 119 Ohio St.

338, 164 N.E. 353
follows:

term,

(1928), the essential

facts were as

On February 28, 1926, the owner of real estate

listed his property with a broker and agreed in writing to
pay the broker a commission for finding a purchaser with the
specified period of five days.

At the end of the five days,

the owner orally promised to extend indefinitely the time of
performance.

In reliance upon the owner's oral promise, the

broker continued its efforts to find a buyer.

Meanwhile,

the owner, in disregard of his oral promise, hired another
broker at a reduced commission, and consummated a sale with
a buyer with whom the first broker was also negotiating.
The lower court ruled in favor of the first broker's claim
for a commission, and the owner appealed.
The Ohio Supreme Court reversed, and remanded for a
dismissal of the claim, based upon the owner's motion that
the claim was barred by the Ohio statute of frauds (almost
identical to Utah's, see 164 N.E. 353, at 354).

In deter-

mining whether the oral promise was a material change in the
terms of the contract, the Ohio Supreme Court held:

-8-

The contract attempted to be
avoided by oral agreement was a definite
contract signed by the defendant that he
would pay a commission if the property
was sold "before
the expiration of this
agreement •If The oral agreement was a new
contract
affecting
the
time
of
performance, and, by substituting a new
time of performance, varied an essential
term of the written contract. To hold
otherwise would be to nullify the provisions of the statute of frauds with
respect
to
real
estate
commission
contracts.
164 N.E. 353, at 355
(emphasis added).
The Franke case is significant also in that the
owner in Franke was the instigator and moving force in
procuring the oral extension of time, whereas in the present
case, a review of Warren Burbankfs affidavit, R, at 89-90,
shows that it was the broker who initiated and pushed for
the oral extension of time of performance.
In Bennett & Kahnweiler Associates v. Rattner, 133
111. App. 3d 316, 478 N.E. 2d 1138 (1985), the original
written listing agreement provided that the broker was entitled to a commission if the property was disposed of within
180 days after the termination date, if the lessee was a
prospect to whom the property had been submitted during the
term of the agreement, provided the prospectfs name was
submitted

to

the lessor

within

termination of the agreement.

ten days

following

the

What happened in Bennett &

Kahnweiler was that the broker had procured a prospective
lessee prior to the expiration of the agreement, had submit-

-9-

ted

its

name

to

the

lessor

within

ten

days

of

the

termination of the agreement, but, due to the lessor's
footdragging, and various other negotiations, the lease was
not finalized signed until 207 days after the termination
date.

The lessor, Ratner, refused

to pay the broker,

Bennett & Kahnweiler, its commission.
The Illinois Appellate Court noted that the original listing agreement contained the extension clause, in
writing, and that the written extension clause generated no
rights

or

duties

agreement.

not

Thus,

already
the

present

original

in

the

written

listing
agreement

contemplated, in writing, performance after the agreement's
termination

date.

In

the

present

case, the

Contract

contained no such extension clause, and the oral extension
granted by Mr. Burgess was really a modification.

In fact,

in the district court, the Appellants argued that the rule
of law in Wieneke Properties, Inc. v. Thiessen, 96 Or. App.
306, 765 P.2d

815

(Or. App. 1988) and, by implication,

Bennett & Kahnweiler, supra, was applied by this court in
Hurlburt v. Gullo, 750 P. 2d 613 (Utah App. 1988).
the handwritten lease in Hurlburt read as follows:
April 18, 1983
Don Foote agrees to lease approx. 5 acres
with water, located at 1805 W. 400 N. ,
Slaterville, to Don Hurlburt for $150.00
per year. Don Hurlburt has the option to
extend lease for an additional five years
at the same terms ... 750 P.2d 613, at
614 (emphasis added).
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However,

Thus, Hurlburt and Bennett & Kahnweiler, are distinguishable
because in both cases the written contract sought to be
extended contemplated extension by its own express terms,
with only the notice of election being oral.

In the present

case, the Sales Agency Contract contains no such express
renewal or extension provisions.
Wieneke

Properties,

Inc.

v.

Thiessen,

supra,

appears to be more on point for Appellants, in that it did
not concern a written extension-of-time clause.

Appellants

argue that Wieneke Properties supports their position that a
written extension of time is not required to satisfy Utah's
relevant Statute of Frauds.

In Wieneke, however, the Oregon

Appellate Court, relied upon prior Oregon case law that had
already established that a written extension of time was not
required if the parties expressly agreed, citing Ferris v.
Meeker Fertilizer Co., 258 Or. 377, 482 P.2d 523 (1971).

As

argued above, prior Utah case law is to the contrary, see,
e.g., Golden Key Realty, Inc. v. Mantas, 699 P.2d 730 (Utah
1985) (modification of original agreement within statute of
frauds must also satisfy statute of frauds).

Thus, Wieneke

Properties is also distinguishable, and this fact situation,
involving a modification, is not a case of first impression.
POINT II. APPELLANTS ARE REALLY
ATTEMPTING TO
RECOVER IN QUANTUM MERUIT, WHICH UTAH
LAW PROHIBITS.
It is submitted that Appellants are really attempting to recover their commission under a quantum meruit

-11-

theory.

One

of

the

cases

cited

by

them,

Bennett

&

Kahnweiler, supra, was decided partly upon a quantum meruit
basis, see 478 N.E.2d 1138 (111. App. 1985), at 1141, citing
the cases of Arthur Rubloff & Co. v. Comco Corp. , 63 111.
App. 3d 362, 380 N.E.2d 15 (1978) and Dickerson Realtors,
Inc.

v.

Frewert,

16

111. App.

3d

1060, 307 N.E.2d

445

(1974), for the rule that it would be inequitable to allow
the principal to benefit from a broker's services without
meeting the burden of payment of the broker's commission.
This would, in fact, appear to contradict Appellants1 assertion in their brief, that neither Illinois nor Oregon allows
a real estate broker to recover a commission under a quantum
meruit theory (Brief of Appellant, p. 12, lines 7-9).
Utah does not allow a real estate broker to recover
in quantum meruit.

In Young v. Buchanan, 259 P.2d 876 (Utah

1953), the Utah Supreme Court held that a broker or agent
may recover only by virtue of a contract, and cannot recover
upon the basis of quantum meruit.

[See also, Watson v.

Odell, 58 Utah 276, 198 P.2d 772 (1924); Case v. Ralph, 56
Utah 243, 188 P.640 (1920)].

In the Young case, the Supreme

Court held:
Doubtless
plaintiff
rendered
some measure of services resulting in Mr.
Kingfs purchase of defendant's property.
It has long been established in this
jurisdiction, however, that a broker or
agent may recover only by virtue of contract and cannot recover upon the basis
of quantum meruit.
259 P. 2d 876, at
877.
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Any unfairness or harshness in this rule and its
results addressed recently by this Court in Machan Hampshire
Properties v. Western Real Estate & Development Company, 779
P.2d 230 (Utah App. 1989).

In footnote 8, it was noted:

Although application of the
statute may lead to harsh results where a
real
estate
broker's
labors
go
uncompensated, a broker must be presumed
to know
that
an oral
contract
of
employment for rendition of services in
negotiating a sale of real estate for a
commission is invalid. Gray v. Kohlhase,
18 Ariz. App. 368, 502 P. 2d 169, 172
(1972).
A broker who fails to secure
written authorization assumes the risk of
relying on oral promises and has no cause
to complain if efforts go unrewarded.
Pacific Southwest Dev. Corp. v. Western
Pac. R.R., 47 Cal.2d 62, 301 P.2d 825,
831 (1963).
Judge Orme, concurring in Machan Hampshire Properties, also
observed:
While this may seem a harsh
result, it does not require our apology.
The very adoption of a statute of frauds
reflects the Legislature's
considered
judgment that, with certain kinds of very
important arrangements, it is preferable
to invalidate a few otherwise legitimate
agreements because they were not written
than to burden the system and the citizenry with claims premised on bogus,
unwritten agreements.
779 P. 2d 230, at
237.
Licensed real estate brokers doubtless are aware of
the requirements of the Statute of frauds.

It would have

been a simple matter to obtain Mr. Burgess's signature on
either a new listing agreement or an extension embodying all

-13-

material terms.

This was not done and the brokers are pro-

hibited from recovering in quantum meruit.

Even if they

were not, since the property did not sell, Mr. Burgess was
not unjustly enriched at the broker's expense.
CONCLUSION
Utah statutory

and case law requires a listing

agreement to be in writing, signed by the party to be
charged, and also requires that any modification of such
listing agreement also be in writing, in order to satisfy
the requirements of Utah's statute of frauds relating to the
sale of real estate by a broker.
period

of

such

a

listing

Varying the durational

agreement

constitutes

a

modification of an essential term, and it must be in writing
as mentioned above.
to

procure

any

In the present case, the brokers fail

such

written

extension,

and

the

oral

extension granted by Mr. Burgess does not satisfy the statute of frauds.

The district court was therefore correct in

granting summary judgment to Mr. Burgess and dismissing the
Broker's Complaint with prejudice.

Mr. Burgess requests

that this court affirm in its entirety the decision of the
district court and award him his costs on appeal.
DATED this /-V*^ day of ( j7jjJ&^~

MARTIN W. CUSTEN
Attorney for Appellee
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1990.

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
* * * * * * * * * * * *

I hereby certify that on this

/*7^

day of

October, 1990, I mailed four true and correct copies of the
above and foregoing Brief of Appellee, postage prepaid, to
Mr, Phillip C. Patterson of Patterson and Barking, 427 27th Street, Ogden, 84401.

fihjdZLk)

MARTIN W. CUSTEN
Attorney for Appellee
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ADDENDUM

ADDENDUM - EXHIBIT A

1

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF DAVIS COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

2
3
4

*****

WARDLEY CORPORATION BETTER
HOMES AND GARDENS, ET AL.,
PLAINTIFFS,

5
6
7
8

VS.

BENCH RULING

R. DAVID BURGESS,

Civil No. 890745358

DEFENDANT,
•****«*-

9
10

BE IT REMEMBERED that this matter came on regularly

11

for hearing before the Honorable Rodney S. Paae, Judge,

12

sitting at Farmmgton, Utah on the 10th day of April 1990.

13

Whereupon the following proceedings were had, to wit:

14
15

*****

APPEARANCES:

16

For the plaintiffs:

Philip C. Patterson

17

For the defendant:

Martin W. Custen

18
19
20

*****

FARMINGTON, UTAH
THE COURT:

APRIL 10, 1990

11:30 A.M.

The Court will make the following

21

ruling in the matter:

22

parties initially entered into a listing aareement which

23

they both executed and which expired by its terms on the

24

26th of January 1989.

25

requires, that any agreement for compensation between a

First of all, it is clear these

The Court finds, and I think the law

DEAN
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C . S . R„
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1

a broker and a seller has to be in writing.

2

it's clear from the Machan aqreement —

3

case that our Court of Appeals and the other cases indicate

4

that the Supreme Court is going to hold brokers and realtors

5

to a higher degree than they would other people.

6

chosen to do that for whatever reason.

7

evidenced by the fact that the theory of part performance

8

and the theory of quantum meruit are not available in those

9

kind of cases.

10

And I think

or excuse m e , Machan

They've

I think that's

In this particular case, there is no other evidence

11

or writing of any nature which essentially extends the

12

listing agreement here in question.

13

connection would be the earnest money closing —

14

money agreement which makes no reference to either —

15

kind of a listing agreement or any kind of a commission

16

statement.

17

The only possible
the earnest
any

I think there is no question that in order to avoid

18

the requirement of statute of frauds, there must be some

19

kind of writing which would come within the purview of meet-

20

ing the requirements of the statute of frauds.

21

The Court further finds that the law in the State of

22

Utah requires that a writing which in fact falls within the

23

statute of frauds, which does not in and of itself provide

24

for an exception thereto, requires that any agreement to

25

modify or change or extend that agreement at least so far

DEAN C. O L S E N , C. S. R.
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1

as it involves brokerage agreements has to meet the

2

requirements of the statute of frauds also.

3

The Court finds that in this case, there is no such

4

evidence.

5

document signed by the person sought to be charged so as

6

to comply with that requirement.

7

Court would grant the defendant's motion for summary

8

judgment.

9

And there is no such writing or agreement or

And for that reason, the

The Court will ask, Mr. Custen, that you prepare a

10

finding and order in accordance with this Court's ruling.

11

That that should be submitted to Mr. Patterson so he can

12

make sure whatever he wants is in there in the event he

13

chooses to have this reviewed by a higher court.

14

will be the order of the Court in this matter.

15

MR. CUSTEN:

Thank you.

16

a transcript of the —

17

Honor.

But that

We'd like —• we will order

from Mr. Olsen, if that's okay, your

18

THE COURT:

Sure.

19

MR. CUSTEN:

You still have my address, I assume?

20

Send it to me.

21

THE COURT:

Thank you, counsel.

22

MR. CUSTEN:

Thank you, your Honor,

23

*****

24
25
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1

CERTIFICATE

2 I STATE OF UTAH

)
) ss
3 I COUNTY OF DAVIS)
4

THIS IS TO CERTIFY that the foregoing three pages of

5

transcript constitute a true and accurate record of the

6

proceedings to the best of my knowledge and ability as a

7

certified shorthand reporter in and for the State of Utah.

8

Dated at Farmington, Utah this 10th day of April 1990.

9
10

l\jo^C-cMW A ^

11

Dean C. Olsen
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25

DEAN C. OLSEN, C. S. R.
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ADDENDUM - EXHIBIT B

MARTIN W. CUSTEN
MARQUARDT, HASENYAGER & CUSTEN
Attorneys for Defendant
2661 Washington Boulevard, Suite 202
Ogden, Utah 84401
Telephone: (801) 621-3662
Utah State Bar No. 0785
IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF DAVIS COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
FINDING AND ORDER OF
SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN
FAVOR OF DEFENDANT

WARDLEY CORPORATION BETTER
HOMES AND GARDENS, NORMA
ZAMPEDRI, HOMESTEAD REALTORS
and WARREN BURBANK,
Plaintiffs,r
vs.

Civil No.

R. DAVID BURGESS,

Judge:

Defendant.

45358

Rodney S. Page

The above-entitled matter came on regularly for
hearing on April 10, 1990 on defendant's Motion for an Order
Granting Summary Judgment against plaintiffs and each of
them on ground that there is no genuine issue as to any
material fact in this action and that defendant is entitled
to judgment in his favor as a matter of law.

The Motion was

based on the file in this case, the pleadings herein, and
the Affidavits of Warren Burbank and Norma Zampedri on file
herein, and on all of the papers and documents filed in support of the Motion, including Memoranda of Law.
Defendant

appeared

by

his

attorney,

MARQUARDT, HASENYAGER & CUSTEN

Martin W*

Wardley et al v. Burgess
Civil No. 45358
Page 2

Custen of Marquardt, Hasenyager & Custen, and the plaintiffs
appeared by their attorney, Philip C. Patterson.

On due

consideration of the records and files in this matter, the
original and all other pleadings, the Affidavits of Warren
Burbank and Norma Zampedri, all other papers and documents
filed by the parties herein, the oral argument of counsel
for the respective parties and the Memoranda of Law filed by
counsel, and being duly advised in the premises, the Court
now enters the following findings in support of its summary
judgment ruling:
1.

The parties initially entered into a listing

agreement which

both

indicated

and

which by

its terms

expired on January 26, 1989.
2.

Any agreement for compensation between a real

estate broker and a seller has to be in writing pursuant to
Section 25-5-4 (5) Utah Code Annotated, as amended.
3.

Any broker's agreement required to come within

the statute of frauds by the law of the State of Utah, which
does not in of itself provide for an exception thereto, can
be modified, changed or extended only by another agreement
that satisfies the requirements of the statute of frauds.
4.

In this case, the undisputed facts reveal that

MARQUARDT, HASENYAGER & CUSTEN

Wardley et al v. Burgess
Civil No. 45358
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there is no such document or evidence of any document signed
by the defendant, whereby the defendant agreed in writing to
extend

or

modify

the

terms

of

the

original

listing

agreement, which original agreement expired on January 26,
1989.
Based upon the above, it is the Court's opinion and
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the defendant is entitled as a
matter

of

law

to

a

summary

judgment

dismissing

the

plaintiff's Complaint.
Let a judgment be entered accordingly*
DATED this

\J<"1 day of

fj^A

, 1990-

BY THE COURT:

ML

RODNEY S. PAGE
District Court Judge

PHILIP C. PATTERSON
Attorney for Plaintiffs

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
* * * * * * * * * * * *

I hereby certify that on this

/ ^

day of

April, 1990, I mailed a true and correct original and copy
MARQUARDT, HASENYAGER & CUSTEN

Wardley et al v. Burgess
Civil No, 45358
Page 4

of the above and foregoing Finding and Order of Summary
Judgment, postage prepaid, to Philip C. Patterson, attorney
for plaintiffs, 427 - 27th Street, Ogden, UT

SECRETARY

~~

MARQUARDT, HASENYAGER & CUSTEN

84401.

ADDENDUM - EXHIBIT C

MARTIN W. CUSTEN
MARQUARDT, HASENYAGER & CUSTEN
Attorneys for Defendant
2661 Washington Boulevard, Suite 202
Ogden, Utah 84401
Telephone: (801) 621-3662
Utah State Bar No. 0785
IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF DAVIS COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
WARDLEY CORPORATION BETTER
HOMES AND GARDENS, NORMA
ZAMPEDRI, HOMESTEAD REALTORS
and WARREN BURBANK,

JUDGMENT DISMISSING
COMPLAINT

Plaintiffs,
f

vs.
R. DAVID BURGESS,
Defendant.

Civil No. 45358
Judge:

Rodney S. Page

The above-entitled matter having come on for hearing on April 10, 1990 before the Honorable Rodney S. Page,
District Court Judge, on defendant's Motion for an Order
granting defendant's summary judgment of dismissal of the
plaintiff's Complaint against all plaintiffs, and the Court,
having already entered its Order granting summary judgment
to defendant having therein directed entry of a judgment of
dismissal in accordance therewith.
Now, therefore, IT IS HEREBY

ORDERED

that the

plaintiff's Complaint be and the same is hereby dismissed
with prejudice.

MARQUARDT, HASENYAGER & CUSTEN

Wardley et al v. Burgess
Civil No. 45358
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DATED this

#

day of

W
Of

, 1990,

BY THE COURT:

M.

RODNEY S. PAGE
District Court Judge

PHILIP Cu PATTERSON
Attorney Yifor Plaintiffs

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
* * * * * * * * * * * *

I hereby certify that on this

'S*

/

day of

April, 1990, I mailed a true and correct original and copy
of the above and foregoing Judgment Dismissing Complaint,
postage

prepaid,

to

Philip

C.

Patterson, Attorney

Plaintiffs, 427 - 27th Street, Ogden, Utah 84401.
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SECRETARY

MARQUARDT, HASENYAGER & CUSTEN

for

